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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1880 Utah Laws ch. 20 §6 (Appellee's Addendum 1) in addition to those statutes listed 
by HCIC (Appellant's Addendum Tab W). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
This appeal involves a quiet title action as to the prior right to use water from 
Cedar Creek, a small stream in Emery County, Utah. Appellees United States Fuel 
Company and ANR Co., Inc. and Intervenor Appellee Intermountain Power Agency and 
their predecessors in interest (collectively "USF"), have diverted and used water from 
Cedar Creek since 1882. The trial court determined that USF's priority date of 1882 is 
senior to that of Appellant Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company ("HCIC"). The 
trial court further confirmed that since 1882, USF has taken this water upstream from the 
point where HCIC on appeal now alleges to have a senior right to divert the same water. 
The trial court correctly found that HCIC for generations failed to receive enough water 
downstream from USF to satisfy its alleged right to receive the first 10 cubic feet per 
second ("cfs") of Cedar Creek. HCIC sat idly by while USF made substantial 
investments upstream to divert water for livestock, irrigation of Cedar Creek Ranch 
(herein "Ranch"), and for municipal, industrial and coal mining uses in Mohrland and 
later in Hiawatha, Utah. 
HCIC had numerous opportunities to protest USF's conflicting upstream water use 
before the state engineer and to appeal decisions approving USF's upstream water use 
projects in 1907, 1930, 1948, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1972, 1978 and 1984. 
USF's unfettered use of water upstream from HCIC since 1882 governs this case and 
requires that this Court affirm the trial court's decision. USF's upstream beneficial use 
and senior priority defeats HCIC's appeal which relies on alleged paper "firings" and 
asserted "priority dates" to claim rights in Cedar Creek which are unsupported by HCIC's 
beneficial use of water. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
Since 1882, USF and its predecessors have enjoyed peaceful, continuous and open 
beneficial use of irrigation water upstream from HCIC's alleged point of diversion on 
Cedar Creek in Emery County, Utah. (Findings ffif 17, 18, 21, 23; R.2739; Exs. 5G, 27B, 
27C, 127, 128.) Since 1875 without interference or interruption, USF and its 
predecessors used water from Cedar Creek and springs tributary to Cedar Creek to water 
livestock upstream from HCIC. (Findings ffl[ 11, 13, 14, R.2737.) USF's 1882 priority is 
also supported by documents of record in Emery County Recorder's Office since 1886. 
(Findings 1fl[ 18, 21, R.2739, 2740.) USF and its predecessors used water from Cedar 
Creek to irrigate and water livestock on the Ranch and for municipal and industrial uses 
in the town of Mohrland and later in Hiawatha, Utah. USF's upstream water use went 
unchallenged until 1989 when its use was interrupted for the first time, precipitating this 
action. (Findings f 26, R.2742; Exs. 127 and 128.) 
In 1889 and 1893, USF's predecessors published and adjudicated their senior use 
of Cedar Creek water. In 1889, they filed Desert Land patent applications with the 
United States Land Office. Land patent depositions confirm that USF's predecessors in 
interest constructed an earthen dam and ditch and diverted for use of the entire flow of 
Cedar Creek on the Ranch prior to 1889 upstream from HCIC's alleged senior point of 
diversion on the same stream. (Ex. 5A-G.) In 1893, the Emery County Water 
Commissioners adjudicated USF's water rights in Cedar Creek. The water 
commissioners issued a water rights certificate establishing that the first beneficial use of 
Cedar Creek on the Ranch began in 1882 and was without protest or challenge by 
anyone. (Ex. 5C.) 
STATE ENGINEER PROCEEDINGS 
In 1907, USF's predecessor published his use of Cedar Creek water when he filed 
an application with the state engineer to change existing diversion facilities by 
constructing a new dam, enlarging the ditch, and constructing a reservoir—all upstream 
from HCIC's alleged point of diversion. (Findings If 17, R.2739.) HCIC's predecessors 
failed to protest this application. (Ex. 27A, 27B, 27C.) This was the first of USF's state 
engineer filings for use of Cedar Creek water made over many decades to which HCIC 
failed to object. (Findings fflf 24, 25, 26, R.2741-42.) 
HCIC failed to: (i) protest USF's three applications to appropriate water upstream 
published in 1930 and 1957 (Exs. 27A, 30A and 37A) and four upstream change 
applications published in 1948, 1957 and 1972 (Exs. 27F, 31 A, 32A and 35A); (ii) seek 
judicial review of each of the twelve certificates of appropriation that the state engineer 
issued to USF (Exs. 27E, 271, 30D, 3 ID, 32D, 33F, 34C, 35D, 37D, 371 and 38D); or 
(iii) protest USF's upstream nonuse extension applications published in 1943 (Ex. J), 
1948 (Ex. I), 1953 (Ex. 50H), 1958 (Ex. 50G), 1963 (Ex. 50F), 1968 (Ex. 50E) and 1978 
(Ex. C). (Findings ffl[ 24, 25, 26, R.2741-42.) 
On October 11, 1957, USF filed an application to appropriate mine water 
developed in the Blackhawk Mine, water determined by the state engineer to be in the 
Price River Drainage. (Ex. 37A.) The state engineer published the application in the 
Emery County Progress from May 14, 1959 to May 28, 1959. See id. HCIC did not 
protest this application. See id. The proof established that the water was used in 
Hiawatha for washing coal and coal byproducts, floating of resin, fire protection and 
industrial purposes. (Ex. 37B.) On August 4, 1961, the state engineer issued a certificate 
confirming that USF had completed its appropriation of the Blackhawk Mine water 
within the Price River Drainage. (Ex. 37D.) HCIC did not appeal this certificate. 
Beginning in 1972, USF directed the Blackhawk Mine water to the Mohrland 
Mine portal through USF's interconnecting underground tunnels and mine workings and 
began conveying a portion of the water through a pipeline to the town of Hiawatha. The 
Blackhawk Mine water from the Price River Drainage commingled with the Mohrland 
Mine water in the San Rafael River drainage. In 1972, USF filed change applications 
with the state engineer for the pipeline and changed water use. (R.2785, T.90:5-14, 
127:5-128:1, 142:4-12, 147:9-16; R.2787, T.586:5-589:4, 607:4-609:23, 611:3-21, 629:2-
20; R.2788, T.810:7-25, 813:8-19, 816:5-821:21; R.2790, T.1413:12-1414:21, 1431:15-
18, 1448:10-1449:9; R.2791, T. 1522:12-1523:6, 1545:12-1546:16, 1548:14-1550:5, 
1554:2-6, 1564:11-17; Exs. 33B, 33C, 33F, 34B, 34C, 35C, 35D, 37E, 37G, 37H, 371, 
38C, 38D, 86, 69A.) 
For the first time in nine decades and after nine separate upstream water 
development projects by USF, in 1972 HCIC filed protests against three of USF's four 
change applications. (Exs. 33E and 37F.) In 1973, the state engineer conducted a 
hearing on USF's pipeline change applications. During this hearing, HCIC asserted that 
the Blackhawk Mine water was tributary to Cedar Creek, that it had a senior right to that 
water, and that its rights would be adversely affected. (Conclusions ffi[ 15, 16, R.2750; 
Exs. 33E and 37F.) 
The state engineer held a second hearing in 1983 and another in 1984, but HCIC 
failed to appear for either hearing. See id HCIC failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies and appeal to district court not only the state engineer's approvals of USF's 
pipeline change applications but also the state engineer's certificates of change. (Exs. 
33F, 34C, 35D, 371 and 38D.) 
A 
NOTICE OF USF'S UPSTREAM WATER USE 
HCIC was on notice of USF's upstream water use and development. The 
extensive upstream water use, development and investment was set forth in notices 
published once a week for four consecutive weeks in the Emery County Progress in 1907 
(Ex. 27A), 1933 (Ex. 30A), 1948 (Ex. 31 A), 1953 (Ex. 32A), 1957 (Exs. 27F), and 1972 
(Exs. 33A, 34A, 35A, 37A, 38A). 
HCIC did not receive sufficient water to satisfy its claim to the first 10.0 cubic feet 
per second ("cfs") of Cedar Creek water. (Findings ffl 24, 25, R.2741-42.) HCIC did not 
take all of the water that was in Cedar Creek because great portions of the flow were 
diverted and used upstream for decades.l Id. The flow of Cedar Creek never exceeded 
10.0 cfs2 in the early spring, except during floods, and actually averaged less than 2.0 cfs 
into the irrigation season and dwindled to less than 1.0 cfs in late summer. (Findings 
% 25, R.2741,2785, T. 144:11-145:4; R.2790, T.1239:4-22.) The flows of Cedar Creek 
were diverted upstream and used on the Ranch and the towns of Mohrland and later in 
Hiawatha. 
USF's INVESTMENT IN UPSTREAM WATER USE 
USF and its predecessors made significant investment in diversion dams, ditches 
and reservoirs to use Cedar Creek water upstream from HCIC and its predecessors. (Exs. 
27B, 27C, 27D.) Between 1882 and 1972, USF constructed and maintained diversion 
1
 John Nielson: R.2785, T.85:10-13 (diverted "all" of Cedar Creek), T. 123:8-9 ("I 
noticed there wasn't water going down up there at the diversion"), R.2785, T. 125:8-9 
("We used all the water there was"); Mike Watson: R.2787, T.695:20-22 ("all the water 
was diverted to the Ranch and none diverted out into the original channel"); Larry Pierce: 
R.2787, T.579:2-4 ("All" of the water in Cedar Creek was diverted to the Ranch); Robert 
Gitlin: R.2789, T.602:24-25 ("All of the water always went to the ranch. We did not 
allow any water to go by."); Robert Eccli: R.2788, T.806:l 1-13 ("all o f the water in 
Cedar Creek was diverted to the Ranch); Ross Black: R.2787, T.579:2-4 (same). 
2
 See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-2 (standard unit of measurement of water flow is 
discharge of one cubic foot per second time and is known as a second-foot of water). 
dams, structures and pipelines to divert, convey and store water for irrigation and 
stockwatering on and above the Ranch, municipal and domestic uses in Mohrland and 
Hiawatha and industrial uses in Hiawatha. (Findings Iff 24, 25, R.2741-42; Exs. 27G, 
27H, 30B, 30C, 3 IB, 31C, 32B, 32C, 33B, 33C, 34B, 35C, 37B, 37C, 37G, 37H, 38C.) 
USF invested $83,000 to construct its new pipeline from Mohrland to Hiawatha. 
(R.2787, T.721:20-722:22, R.2788, T.816:8-10.) In developing its water pipeline, USF 
relied on seven decades of silence by HCIC, and numerous approvals by the State 
Engineer authorizing USF's water use investment, including five certificates of 
appropriation issued in 1912, 1935, 1957, 1961 and 1962 (Findings ffif 24, 25, R.2741-42; 
Exs. 27E, 271, 30D, 3 ID, 32D, 35D and 37D). 
CONFLICTING DILIGENCE CLAIMS 
USF was the upstream water user and had no reason to worry about downstream 
diversion of water below USF's point of diversion. No one interfered with USF's 
upstream diversions and water use until 1989, and thereafter this litigation was 
commenced. (Findings f 26, R.2742; Exs. 127, 128.) 
USF filed objections to the San Rafael Proposed Determination listing HCIC as 
senior in priority. (Exs. 48B, 48C.) USF objected to the listing of all rights of "junior 
appropriators." This reference to junior appropriators encompassed HCIC's alleged 
water right because the evidence of first use confirmed that HCIC had a junior priority to 
USF's senior right (Findings fflf 19-23, 27, R.2740-42.) USF supplemented its protest, 
specifically objecting to HCIC's statement of user claim. (Ex. 48C.) 
A flood bridge used by HCIC located two miles downstream from the Ranch at the 
intersection of Cedar Creek and the Cleveland Canal was found to exist no earlier than 
1929. (Findings \ 20, R.2740; R.2787, T.594:19-595:20.) There was no evidence as to 
the date of its construction, and the flood bridge itself is not evidence that the waters 
6 
commingled prior to 1903 and, in any event, not prior to March 1,1888 as HCIC alleged. 
(Findings f 20, R.2740.) 
The trial court found documentary evidence in favor of USF's priority date of 
March 1, 1882 more persuasive and reliable than the speculative testimony presented by 
HCIC's expert witness as to its asserted priority dates of 1877 and May 1, 1888. The best 
and most accurate evidence of a priority date is documentary in nature rather than 
conclusions and opinions reached by reading historical accounts and assuming dates of 
commingling of waters. The affidavit of John Monsen states a specific date on which 
water was beneficially used by USF's predecessor; whereas HCIC can only surmise that 
water was beneficially used on the date it asserts. (Findings f 21, R.2740-2741; Ex. 27A, 
27B, 27E.) 
Even if the waters of Cedar Creek commingled with the waters of Cleveland Canal 
on May 1, 1888, there is no evidence that it was placed to beneficial use prior to 1903. 
(Findings f 20, 22, R.2740-2741.) Moreover, HCIC failed to establish at trial specifically 
which lands, if any, were irrigated with Cedar Creek water prior to 1903. (Findings f 22, 
R.2741.) HCIC's primary water rights derive from Huntington Creek, not Cedar Creek, 
and are used to irrigate some 32,000 acres of land. (Ex. 55; R.2788, T.881:15-890:16.) 
On the other hand, USF uses Cedar Creek as one of its primary sources of water.3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
HCIC, not USF, is barred by estoppel, laches and waiver. Since USF's 
predecessor began using Cedar Creek in 1882, there has not been sufficient water from 
Cedar Creek to satisfy HCIC's alleged senior claim to the first 10.0 cfs of water 
3
 HCIC notes that the trial court did not reject its diligence right but held that its 
alleged right is junior to USF's diligence right. In effect what this means is that HCIC 
would have the right to receive all of the water in Cedar Creek that exceeds 5.246 cfs, the 
quantity of water USF has the senior right to receive first. HCIC's appeal inappropriately 
seeks to take the first 10.0 cfs and leave the rest, if any, to USF. 
downstream from USF's extensive upstream diversion and use of the same water. HCIC 
for decades failed to protest USF's upstream appropriation and use of water since 1882. 
HCIC stood idly by without protest and allowed USF to make substantial investments in 
completing nine (9) projects to divert, convey, appropriate and beneficially use water 
upstream from HCIC. HCIC repeatedly failed to exhaust its administrative remedies to 
challenge USF's upstream use or to appeal for judicial review the state engineer's 
numerous approvals of USF's upstream appropriations and use of Cedar Creek water. 
HCIC did not appeal any of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that 
HCIC is barred from asserting a senior right against USF. 
For these same reasons, USF is not barred by the doctrines of estoppel, laches and 
waiver. Neither HCIC nor anyone else deprived USF of any water. USF and its 
predecessors always have taken their water first before any other water user. For this 
reason, USF is not barred by any of the state engineer decisions approving its upstream 
water use. Moreover, the 1889 Desert Land Patent Depositions, the 1893 Water 
Certificate, and the 1910 John Monsen Affidavit and Proof all support USF's 1882 
priority of water use upstream from HCIC without any protest or challenge whatsoever. 
Neither HCIC's diligence claim nor the San Rafael Proposed Determination bars 
USF. USF's extensive, conflicting upstream water use contradicts HCIC's assertions that 
USF did not challenge HCIC's alleged seniority. Moreover, USF filed objections to the 
proposed determination challenging all junior appropriators listed as senior to USF. This 
objection was supplemented to specifically challenge HCIC. HCIC did not appeal the 
trial court's findings and conclusions that its rights were junior to USF's. The district 
court accepted USF's objections, and no one has ever moved to strike these pleadings. 
Further, public policy favors allowing USF's action for monetary damages and 
declaratory and injunctive relief to be heard outside of the general water rights 
adjudication. 
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Finally, USF has not forfeited any of its water rights partially or otherwise. USF 
placed to beneficial all available water from Cedar Creek. There can be no forfeiture 
where a water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy a water right and all 
available water is placed to beneficial use. The law of partial forfeiture of water rights 
does not apply retroactively in this case. This Court should affirm the trial court's 
findings because HCIC failed to marshal all the evidence of irrigated acres on Cedar 
Creek. Moreover, the trial court properly admitted Don Barnett's testimony to rebut the 
opinion testimony received from HCIC's witness as to the number of acres irrigated on 
the Ranch. Further, HCIC failed to prove that USF violated any customary and accepted 
irrigation practices in the area for similar soil types. For this reason, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling that USF did not forfeit any water rights by waste. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HCIC--NOT USF--IS BARRED BY ESTOPPEL, LACHES, AND WAIVER 
The Court should reject HCIC's theory and arguments on appeal because 
analytically and physically, they do not run upstream. HCIC ignores that its alleged 
diversion was located downstream from USF's upstream diversion and extensive use of 
water. Further, since USF's predecessor began using Cedar Creek in 1882, there has not 
been sufficient water to satisfy HCIC's alleged senior claim to the first 10.0 cfs of water 
downstream from USF. HCIC has: (i) failed to protest USF's upstream appropriation 
and use of Cedar Creek since 1882; (ii) stood idly by without protest and allowed USF to 
make substantial investments in completing nine (9) projects to divert, convey, 
appropriate and beneficially use Cedar Creek upstream from HCIC, (iii) repeatedly failed 
to exhaust its administrative remedies to challenge USF's upstream use; and 
(iv) repeatedly failed to appeal for judicial review the state engineer's numerous 
approvals of USF's upstream appropriations and use of Cedar Creek. 
HCIC did not appeal the trial court's conclusions of law and findings of fact that 
HCIC is barred from asserting a senior right against USF. (Findings f 24, R.2741; 
Conclusions f 9, R.2749.) Instead HCIC appealed the trial court's conclusion of law that 
USF is not barred. (Conclusions 1J19, R.2751.) If the Court were to rule in HCIC's 
favor, it would lead to the absurd result that both USF and HCIC are barred from using 
Cedar Creek. The Court should affirm the trial court's ruling because HCIC did not 
challenge the trial court's conclusions and findings that HCIC is barred. 
The trial court correctly found that HCIC was receiving less than its alleged right 
to receive the first 10.0 cfs of Cedar Creek water. (Findings ^ 25, R.2741.) HCIC did not 
challenge this finding and sidestepped its effect in its opening brief. HCIC simply has 
not diligently guarded its purported senior claim to the supply of water in this case. The 
trial court applied the water law principle established by this Court that if HCIC, located 
downstream, 
did not receive sufficient water to satisfy its right, then it 
cannot sit idly by without protest and allow [USF] to 
appropriate water and place it to beneficial use and construct 
improvements and operate in reliance on that water. 
College In. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork In. Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1244 
(Utah 1989); Conclusions f 9, R.2749. HCIC ignores not only this case but the 
significant body of precedent in support of USF's position. 
This Court has repeatedly determined that a senior water right claimant must 
jealously guard their rights and protest any attempt by another to make improvements 
allowing conflicting water use. In Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 98 P.2d 695, 702 
(Utah 1940), a protestant failed to challenge an application to appropriate water filed in 
1911. The applicant "expended large sums for pumps and diversion works and 
contracted with farmer[s] ... to sell them water." Id. at 701. In 1924, the state engineer 
issued applicant's certificate of appropriation. The protestant finally filed a protest in 
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1926, but it was held to be too late because the protestant was barred from asserting his 
claim to the detriment of others. The protestant's silence misled applicant into believing 
there were no senior rights to threaten the applicant's substantial investment in his water 
use project. See id. at 701-02. The applicant relied on the protestant's silence and 
inaction by making substantial investments in placing water to use. The Court noted that 
the protestant could have objected at any time during the administrative process. See id. 
at701.4 
In addition, water users must exercise their statutory rights, folly participate in 
state engineer proceedings, and appeal to district court any adverse state engineer ruling. 
See S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (holding where a water user 
had not participated in the proceedings before the state engineer, the water user waived 
its right to judicial review). 
Two other decisions of this Court established that water users must timely appeal 
any adverse decision of the state engineer; they cannot postpone and delay asserting their 
claims in a later lawsuit. In GlenwoodIrrigation Co. v. Myers, 465 P.2d 1013, 1015 
(Utah 1970) (barring protestant's lawsuit claiming water rights were forfeited because 
action was filed three years after state engineer granted nonuse extension and protestant 
"did not avail itself of the statutory review and sat idly by while defendant... materially 
altered his position"); Provo City v. Lambert, 545 P.2d 185, 186-87 (Utah 1976) (water 
4
 See also Orient Mining Co. v. Freckleton, 74 P. 652, 653-4 (Utah 1903) (water 
user is estopped from claiming senior water right after standing by and watching another 
water user make valuable improvements to place water to use and failing to inform the 
competing user of superior water right); Brixen & Christopher Architects v. Elton, 111 
P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (parties are barred from asserting rights where 
their silence and inaction render it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights); Clark 
v. Kirby, 55 P. 372, 374 (Utah 1898) ('"he who is silent when conscience requires him to 
speak shall be debarred from speaking when conscience requires him to keep silent.'") 
(citation omitted); Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976) 
(estoppel applies when a party is silent "when he ought to speak."). 
user's complaint seeking to modify water rights certificate of appropriation was filed 23 
years too late—appeal should have been within 60 days of state engineer's decision). 
A. HCIC IS BARRED 
HCIC cannot make the doctrines of estoppel, laches or waiver run upstream. 
HCIC adopts USF's theories, turns them on their head, and attempts to change USF's 
long history of upstream water use that conflicted with and directly challenged HCIC's 
alleged rights downstream. HCIC, not USF, is barred because: (i) USF was diverting 
water upstream from HCIC's alleged point of diversion - a direct challenge to HCIC's 
alleged senior right, and (ii) HCIC was not receiving enough water to satisfy its asserted 
right to the first 10.0 cfs from Cedar Creek. (Findings 1f1f 24, 25, R2741; Conclusions 
ffif 9, 16, R.2749-50.) HCIC does not challenge these findings or conclusions. Moreover, 
the trial court's findings directly contradict HCIC's claim that USF "leapfrogged" its 
priority or did not challenge HCIC's claim to a senior right. (Findings ffl[ 26, 27, 
R.2742.) 
HCIC fixates on "filings" and "priority" but completely ignores upstream 
beneficial use by USF which is the "basis, the measure, and the limit of all rights to the 
use of water in this state." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3. USF, not HCIC, acted for decades 
as the first priority user — "first in time is first in right." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork 
Pipeline Corp., 2000 UT 3, If 34, 5 P.3d 1206 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1). There is 
no evidence that HCIC diverted the water in a manner that prevented USF from diverting 
it first. In fact, it was physically impossible for HCIC to divert Cedar Creek prior to 
USF's upstream diversions. There is no evidence that HCIC or anyone else deprived 
USF of any water until 1989 and only then for a short period of time, which action 
precipitated this litigation. (Findings ffll 24, 25, 26, R.2741-42; Conclusions f 9, 16, 
R.2749-50.) 
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HCIC cannot now assert against USF a senior right — it is too late. HCICs 
silence has cast USF into the precarious position of having to reprove over a century of 
upstream diversions and water use. Evidence has been lost. People with personal 
knowledge have died. The unfairness of HCIC's silence is manifest in USF's having to 
now prove the priority of its water rights at this late date when HCIC had every reason to 
file timely protests against USF's conflicting upstream water use. To protect its alleged 
rights, HCIC was required to participate in each of the state engineer's many proceedings 
authorizing USF's upstream water use, exhaust its administrative remedies and appeal to 
district court each state engineer approval of USF's upstream water projects. 
1. HCIC Repeatedly Failed to Exercise Its Statutory Duty 
HCIC repeatedly failured to exercise its statutory duty, not just a failure to protest 
a single application to appropriate as in Tanner, to appeal a single extension application 
as in Glenwood, timely appeal a single certificate to appropriate as in Provo City, protest 
a single water use project as in Orient, or participate in state engineer proceedings 
involving a single change application as in S&G. HCIC blatantly disregarded its 
obligations to challenge USF's upstream water use that deprived HCIC of water that was 
necessary to satisfy its claim to the first 10.0 cfs on Cedar Creek. HCICs inaction began 
as of USF's priority date in 1882 and continued until 1989 when HCIC interfered with 
this use. (Findings If 26, R.2750.) 
As in Tanner, HCIC failed to protest USF's three applications to appropriate water 
upstream in 1907, 1930 and 1957 and four upstream change applications in 1948, 1957 
and 1972. See 1905 Utah Laws ch. 108, § 38, at 157 (granting right to protest); 1919 
Utah Laws ch. 67, § 47, at 191 (same); Utah Code Ann. § 100-3-7 (1943) (same); Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-3-7 (1953) (same); 1959 Utah Laws ch. 137, § 1, at 319 (same). 
Moreover, HCIC failed to protest USF's upstream nonuse extension applications 
in 1943, 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968 and 1978, respectively. See Utah Code Ann. § 
100-3-13 (1943) (granting right to protest); 1947 Utah Laws ch. 142, § 1, at 449 (same); 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-13 (1953) (same). Under Tanner, S & G, and Glenwood, HCIC 
is now barred from protesting any water use under these applications. 
As in S & G, HCIC failed to exhaust its administrative remedies in the state 
engineer's proceedings after filing protests in 1972 against three of USF's four pipeline 
change applications and two nonuse extension applications. See S &G, 797 P.2d at 
1087. After waiting nearly a century until 1972 to file its first protest, HCIC attended 
two hearings in 1973 but failed to participate in the 1983 and 1984 hearings, exhaust its 
administrative remedies and appeal to district court the state engineer's approval of the 
pipeline change applications and issuance of certificates of change. (Findings tlf 24, 25, 
R.2741; Conclusions 1fij 9, 16, R.2749-50.) HCIC is now barred from challenging USF's 
water use under these pipeline change applications and nonuse extension applications. 
As in Glenwood and Provo City, HCIC failed to seek judicial review of the state 
engineer's: (i) approval of the four pipeline change applications; (ii) issuance of twelve 
certificates of appropriation to USF; and (iii) grant of nine nonuse extensions. See 1905 
Utah Laws ch. 108, § 43, at 158 (imposing deadline for appealing to district court state 
engineer's decisions); 1919 Utah Laws ch. 67, § 54, at 193 (same); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 100-3-14 (1943) (same); Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 (1953) (same). 
HCIC is barred from challenging USF's conflicting upstream water use approved 
by the state engineer. Moreover, under East Bench and Glenwood, the trial court cannot 
consider any issue that HCIC could have earlier raised on appeal to district court. East 
Bench Irr. Co, v. Utah, 300 P.2d 603 (Utah 1956). Those issues include forfeiture by 
USF, interference with any vested right of HCIC, the priority between the competing 
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rights of USF and HCIC, and whether the Blackhawk Mine water is tributary to Cedar 
Creek. 
2. USF Relied on HCIC'S Silence 
HCIC's generations of silence in the face of significant investment by USF and its 
predecessors in nine separate upstream water use projects dwarf the facts in Tanner, 
Glenwood, and Orient. HCIC sat idly by without protest allowing USF and its 
predecessors to make substantial investment in the use of water from Cedar Creek and the 
Mohrland Portal USF and its predecessors relied on that silence and inaction in making 
significant investment in diversion dams, ditches and reservoirs to use virtually the entire 
flow of Cedar Creek for irrigating the Ranch and watering livestock. USF made further 
investments in constructing and maintaining pipelines to divert and transfer water for 
irrigation and stock watering on the Ranch, municipal, industrial and domestic uses in 
Mohrland and Hiawatha. (Findings ff 24, 25, R.2741.) 
USF invested $83,000 to construct a new pipeline from Mohrland to Hiawatha. 
USF relied on seven decades of silence by HCIC and numerous approvals by the state 
engineer authorizing USF's water use investment, including five certificates of 
appropriation issued in 1912, 1935, 1957, 1961 and 1962. Relying on HCIC's silence 
and inaction, USF for decades placed water to beneficial use for irrigating and 
stockwatering on the Ranch and conveyed water for nearly two decades through the 
pipeline for industrial uses and numerous municipal and domestic uses in Hiawatha. 
Moreover, USF made substantial investment in maintaining the pipeline from 1972 to the 
filing of this lawsuit. In addition, after filing a protest in 1983, HCIC failed to appeal the 
state engineer's decision approving Extension Application 508 that granted USF an 
additional five years until 1988 to resume use of water formerly used in Mohrland for 
municipal and domestic uses. (Findings f|j 32, 34, R.2744; Ex. 50B.) USF relied on 
HCICs silence and made a substantial investment to complete its diversion to Hiawatha 
through the Mohrland pipeline. (Ex. 50A.) 
3. HCIC was on Notice of the Extensive Upstream Diversion. 
Development and Use of Water 
HCIC was on notice of USF's investment in upstream water development projects 
which were advertised once a week for four consecutive weeks in the Emery County 
Progress in 1907 (Ex. 27A), 1933 (Ex. 30A), 1948 (Ex. 31 A), 1953 (Ex. 32A), 1957 
(Exs. 27F), and 1972 (Exs. 33A, 34A, 35A, 37A, 38A). HCIC remained silent and took 
no action to prevent USF's water use until 1989. (Findings ff 24, 25, 26, R.2741-42; 
Exs. 127 and 128.) 
HCIC was on notice of the upstream diversions, water use and significant 
investment in reliance on HCIC inaction and silence.5 HCIC alleges a right to 
continuously divert the first 10.0 cfs from Cedar Creek before any other water user, 
including USF. There is no doubt that USF's Cedar Creek diversions above the Ranch 
and the town of Mohrland and at the Mohrland Portal removed water that would have 
flowed downstream to HCIC. Because these diversions left significantly less than 10.0 
cfs in Cedar Creek, HCIC had every reason to protest USF's upstream water use 
consistent with College Irrigation, 780 P.2d at 1244. (Conclusions % 9, R.2749.)6 
Since 1886 HCIC has been on constructive notice. March 31, 1886 was the date 
of first recording of a transfer of Cedar Creek water to USF's predecessors in interest. 
(Exs. 6, 7.) Recording of this instrument with the Emery County Recorder "imparts 
notice to all persons of the contents thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1989). 
6
 HCIC has argued that it has a "high flow" water right up to 10 cfs. In essence all 
this really means is that, assuming HCIC has a valid diligence right, it is barred from 
preventing USF from taking the first 5.246 cfs from Cedar Creek but retains the right to 
divert the remainder of Cedar Creek up to 10 cfs. 
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B. HCIC--NOT USF--IS BARRED BY THE 1984 STATE ENGINEER 
DECISIONS 
HCIC asserts that USF did not rely on the 1984 state engineer decisions when it 
built its pipeline to Hiawatha in 1972. Moreover, HCIC argues that it did not have an 
obligation to appeal because the state engineer's decisions were subject to and prohibited 
interference with HCIC's claim to senior rights. However, when viewed in the context of 
all the record, physical evidence and circumstances, it was reasonable for USF to have 
completed the pipeline to Hiawatha based on decades of downstream silence both before 
and after HCIC's single protest in 1972. USF had every reason to believe that it had the 
senior right to divert all of the Cedar Creek and Blackhawk Mine water. Hence, USF 
could complete the pipeline to continue using that water. Moreover, the state engineer 
ratified USF's pipeline and water transfer to Hiawatha when he issued his decisions 
approving the pipeline change applications. Consistent with its prior inactivity, HCIC 
never appealed this approval to district court—even though it was legally obligated to do 
so. 
Curiously, HCIC did not assert a prior right to Cedar Creek water in its 1972 
protest. The protest merely stated that HCIC "holds rights in this area and believes that 
these changes may interfere with these rights." (Ex. 33D.) Even more curious is HCIC's 
protest against USF's Extension Application in 1983 where HCIC merely asserted that it 
"can and has been using this water to better advantage, that United States Fuel Company 
has had sufficient time to resume use, and that it is not reasonable for them to resume 
use." (Ex. 50B.) Further, HCIC requested "forms to apply for this water to be used in 
the Cleveland Canal During[sic] this time period." Id. This request suggests that HCIC 
had not yet appropriated a water right and believed that it needed to apply to the state 
engineer to receive Cedar Creek water already appropriated by USF. 
Further, HCIC's mere allegations in a state engineer proceeding of a senior right 
did not establish its claim. HCIC wrongly presupposes that the state engineer's 
designation of a priority date or administrative recognition of senior rights determines 
priority. This Court has unequivocally established that the "determination of the priority 
of rights is a judicial function and not among the powers of the state engineer." 
Whitmore v. Murray City, 154 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1944). Hence, none of the state 
engineer's priority dates or designations of any senior rights bar USF by estoppel, laches 
or waiver, as HCIC asserts. USF's upstream beneficial use in this case defeats HCIC's 
priority assertion. Moreover, because HCIC never received sufficient water downstream 
to satisfy its alleged senior right, it was required to appeal the 1984 decisions to challenge 
the conflicting upstream use of water. (Conclusions f 9, R.2749.) 
In constructing the pipeline, USF relied on seventy years of silence by HCIC, 
numerous approvals by the state engineer authorizing USF's water use investment, 
including the five Certificates of Appropriation issued in 1912, 1935, 1957,1961 and 
1962. Relying on HCIC's downstream silence and inaction, USF for decades placed 
upstream water to beneficial use for irrigating the Ranch and watering livestock and 
conveyed water during nearly two decades through the pipeline for extensive industrial, 
municipal and domestic uses in Hiawatha. Moreover, USF made substantial investment 
in maintaining the pipeline and storing and placing the water to beneficial use from 1972 
to the filing of this lawsuit. HCIC was silent downstream during this entire period until 
1989 when it briefly interfered with USF's upstream diversions. (Findings f 26, R.2742.) 
C. USF IS NOT BARRED BY 1984 STATE ENGINEER DECISIONS 
HCIC incorrectly asserts that USF is barred by not appealing the state engineer's 
1984 decisions that approved USF's pipeline change applications. The state engineer 
approved the piping of the Blackhawk Mine water from the Mohrland Portal for use in 
Hiawatha and the piping of water from Cedar Creek, formerly used in Mohrland, for use 
in Hiawatha. (Exs. 33E and 33F.) 
USF had no reason to appeal either of the 1984 state engineer memorandum 
decisions. USF had no reason to assert its prior diligence right which had never been 
protested or challenged up to that point in time. Further, USF put the water to use in 
Hiawatha for two decades—this is not "doing nothing at all" as HCIC asserts. Moreover, 
USF was allowed by the state engineer to convey by pipeline all of the Blackhawk Mine 
water together with all of the water that it had previously used in the town of Mohrland.7 
Therefore, USF was not deprived of any water or water use as a result of the state 
engineer's decisions and cannot be barred by estoppel. (Conclusions % 9, R.2749.) 
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT 
BLACKHAWK MINE WATER WAS TRIBUTARY TO CEDAR 
CREEK 
The trial court correctly excluded all evidence relating to whether the Blackhawk 
Mine water is tributary to Cedar Creek. (Findings % 8, R.2736.) The several water law 
decisions decided by this Court and discussed above establish that a protestant must 
appeal the state engineer's decision for de novo review in district court where all issues 
related thereto can be fully and completely litigated. Further, in East Bench, this Court 
held that "there are issues in every appeal from the [state engineer's] decision which 
must be adjudicated." 300 P.2d at 607 (emphasis added). Those issues include 
"impairment of vested rights" of others and "priority of conflicting rights." Id. As in 
Glenwood, HCIC "is now estopped to assert" whether Blackhawk water is tributary to 
Cedar Creek because HCIC did not "avail itself of the statutory review and sat idly by" 
while USF "materially altered its position." 465 P.2d at 1015. 
7
 USF is not claiming a right to any more water than was approved for piping under 
Exhibit 33E. 
At this late date, HCIC is barred from litigating whether the Blackhawk Mine 
water is tributary to Cedar Creek. As in Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 98 P.2d 695, 702 
(Utah 1940), HCIC failed to protest USF's 1957 application to appropriate the 
Blackhawk Mine water. As in S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085,1087 (Utah 1990), 
HCIC did not participate in the proceedings. As in Provo City v. Lambert, 545 P.2d 185, 
186-87 (Utah 1976) and Glenwood Irrigation Company v. Myers, 465 P.2d 1013, 1015 
(Utah 1970), HCIC did not file an appeal of the state engineer's approval of the 
application. 
As in Tanner, Lambert, and Glenwood, USF relied on HCIC's silence in 
completing valuable improvements to divert the mine water from the Blackhawk portal 
located in the Price River drainage. HCIC filed a protest against USF's pipeline change 
applications and raised the tributary issue in the state engineer's proceedings. (Ex. 37F.) 
HCIC participated in the 1973 hearing but not in the 1983 and 1984 hearings. (Findings 
f 16, R.2750.) After the state engineer sent HCIC a copy of his decision approving the 
pipeline change applications, as in Lambert and Glenwood, HCIC failed to appeal.8 USF 
has spent significant sums constructing, repairing and maintaining its pipeline to convey 
the Blackhawk Mine water back to the Price River Drainage. Moreover, downstream 
water users in the Price River Drainage have relied on the Blackhawk Mine water for 
many years since at least 1957. The trial court's ruling quieting USF's title to the 
Blackhawk rights should stand. (Conclusions f 8, R.2748.) 
In addition, the state engineer recognized and included USF's rights to the 
Blackhawk Mine water and its diversion from the Mohrland portal in the Proposed 
Determination of Water Rights in the Price River Drainage, (Area Code No. 91), Book 4, 
Page 987. HCIC never filed an objection against this proposed determination by the state 
engineer and is forever barred from doing so. See, e.g., In re Escalante Valley Drainage 
Area, 12 Utah 2d 112, 113, 363 P.2d 777, 778 (1961) (water users are barred by failing to 
object to proposed determination); Green River Adjudication v. United States, 17 Utah 2d 
50, 52,404 P.2d 251, 252 (1965) (same). 
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E. HCIC--NOT USF--IS BARRED BY 1889 DESERT LAND PATENT 
DEPOSITIONS, 1893 WATER CERTIFICATE, AND 1910 MONSEN 
AFFIDAVIT & PROOF 
HCIC has misconstrued and misapplied the 1889 Desert Land Patent depositions, 
1893 Water Certificate, and 1910 John Monsen Affidavit. These three documents 
support the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that HCIC, not USF, is 
barred by estoppel, laches, and waiver. (Findings ffif 17, 18, 24,25, R.2739-41; 
Conclusions % 9, R.2749.) This Court must give the trial court's findings deference 
because HCIC has not challenged any of the trial court's findings by marshaling 
evidence.9 Further, these documents all pertain to the same diligence right that was 
appropriated by predecessors of USF in placing surface water to beneficial use prior to 
March 12, 1903, the date the Utah Legislature adopted the appropriation system and 
grandfathered prior diligence rights to surface waters. See 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, 
§ 47;10 Eskelsen, 819 P.2d at 771. Moreover, the documents establish that since 1882, 
USF's beneficial water use occurred upstream from HCIC's alleged points of diversion 
9
 HCIC has the duty to "marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite the evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support 
as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 
885 (Utah 1989). 
10
 Under Utah law, a diligence right may be established by showing beneficial 
surface water use prior to 1903 by a user's predecessors in interest. In Eskelsen v. Town 
of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991), the trial court relied on records of the Box Elder 
County Recorder's office and affidavits to establish pre-1903 water use. Id. at 774. The 
Eskelsen trial court also relied on affidavits from people who stated that they were 
"informed" and were "told" of water use predating 1903. Id. Documents in the present 
case go beyond the requirements of Eskelsen and provide direct and specific evidence of 
extensive pre-1903 upstream water use. USF's evidence is more consistent with higher 
evidentiary standards to establish pre-1903 beneficial water use required by this Court in 
earlier cases. Finding ^ f 21; see Richfield Cottonwood Irr. Co. v. City of Richfield, 34 
P.2d 945, 949 (Utah 1934); Aft. Olivet Cemetery Ass fn v. Salt Lake City, 235 P. 876, 878 
(Utah 1925). In addition, HCIC's' expert witness and Regional State Engineer, Mark 
Page, correctly observed during his testimony that there is no time limit placed on filing 
a diligence claim (R.2789, T. 1000:6-8), except for Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-9 (1989), 
which USF satisfied. 
and deprived the downstream user of water to satisfy its alleged senior claim to the first 
10.0 cfs from Cedar Creek. 
1- HCIC is Barred bv the 1889 Land Patent Depositions 
HOC, not USF, is barred by the 1889 Desert Land patent depositions. The 
depositions were submitted in 1889 by USF's predecessors to the United States Land 
Office to support their Desert Land patents. The depositions confirm that USF's 
predecessors in interest constructed an earthen dam and ditch and diverted and used the 
entire flow of Cedar Creek on the Ranch, prior to 1889 and upstream from HCIC's 
alleged point of diversion on the same stream. (Ex. 5A-G.) Thus, the depositions are 
evidence that HCIC was being deprived of water upstream from its alleged senior 
diversion. 
Moreover, the depositions confirm that the Ranch irrigation ditch was constructed 
sometime prior to 1889.11 These depositions do not establish that this water use was the 
first irrigation on the Ranch. Rather, they confirm that the water rights had been 
appropriated by USF's predecessors prior to the execution of the depositions, the whole 
community acquiesced in the upstream water appropriation, and there were no adverse 
claims to the water rights.12 Notice of this upstream activity was published for four 
weeks in the Castle Valley News further evidencing that HCIC had at least constructive 
notice of the upstream water diversion, development and use. (Ex. 5D.) Finally, the 
deposition testimony is limited to supporting a patent for only an 80-acre parcel of the 
11
 A diagram accompanying the proof of John A. Trimble shows a dam on Cedar 
Creek diverting water into a main ditch on the Ranch, the main ditch was dammed, and a 
side ditch was constructed to deliver Cedar Creek water to the 80 acre parcel. (Ex. 5B.) 
12
 See Ex. 5D, R.Gordon Dep., f5 , at 1 ("Claimant acquired and maintained his 
water right by prior appropriation and his right is undisputed and acquiesced in by the 
whole community. There is no adverse claim for either the land or the water.") 
(emphasis added); Ex. 5D, R. Scott Dep., % 5, at 1 (same); Ex. 5D, J. Trimble Dep. f 6 
(same). 
Ranch, a small portion of the lands comprising the Ranch.13 The trial court found that 
135.66 acres on the Ranch were irrigated and 229.3 acres were prepared for irrigation. 
(Findings H 30, R.2743.) 
2. HCIC is Barred by the 1893 Water Certificate 
HCIC, not USF, is barred by the 1893 water certificate. In 1893, the Water 
Commissioners of Emery County, Utah Territory, issued to John Trimble, USF's 
predecessor, a Certificate of Water Right adjudicating the Ranch diligence right under the 
Water Act of 1880, as amended. (Ex. 5C at 4; Ex. 14.) The water commissioners issued 
the water certificate upon "evidence furnished by an abstract of said water right" and 
"records on file with the Emery County Recorder's Office." The title abstract confirmed 
that "prior rights to pre-1889 irrigation on the Ranch dates back to 1886." (Ex. 5B at 13-
19.) 
The water certificate supports USF's 1882 priority date and water use and 
development taking place upstream from HCIC's alleged senior point of diversion 
without any protest or challenge whatsoever. The 1880 Act, as amended, recognized pre-
existing diligence rights as having "vested and accrued" whenever an appropriator had 
the "open, peaceable, uninterrupted and continuous use of water for a period of 7 years." 
1880 Utah Laws ch. 20, § 6, at 37. The water commissioners concluded that the water 
from Cedar Creek was "openly and continuously" used by John A. Trimble and his heirs 
for "domestic purposes and for irrigation . . . for about four years last past." (Ex. 5C at 2-
3.) Therefore, the 1883 certificate actually established first beneficial water use in 1882 
— eleven years earlier than the date of the certificate (i.e., 1893 minus 4 years minus 7 
See Deposition of Witnesses, Robert Gordon, fflf 6, 7 and 9; Deposition of 
Witnesses, John H. Scott, ffl 6, 7 and 9; Deposition of Applicant, John Trimble, % 9 and 
11; Ex. 5B. 
years equals 1882). See Robert W. Swenson, A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part /, 5 J. 
Energy L. & Pol'y 165, 170-3 (1984).14 
HCIC was on notice of the upstream appropriation by USF's predecessors and did 
nothing to protest the conflicting upstream use. The certificate is credible and convincing 
evidence that USF has the senior right on Cedar Creek. The water certificate was 
recorded in the official records of Emery County on January 30, 1893, in Book B, Page 
172. (Ex. 14.) Under § 4 of the 1880 Act, a certificate of water right "shall be deemed to 
impart notice to all persons whomsoever of the contents thereof, and shall be prima facie 
evidence of the existence and verity of facts therein recited." 1880 Utah Laws ch. 20, 
§ 4, at 37 (emphasis added). This Court has determined that a certificate of water right is 
evidence of a pre-1903 diligence right. See Bigler v. Fryer, 25 P.2d 598 (Utah 1933); 
Holman v. Christensen, 274 P. 457,460-61 (Utah 1929). 
3. HCIC is Barred by the 1910 Monsen Affidavit and Proof 
HCIC, not USF, is barred by the John Monsen Affidavit.15 In 1907, USF's 
predecessor in interest filed with the state engineer Application A1408 to improve the 
original ditch diverting Cedar Creek water for use on the Ranch and to construct a 
reservoir to store water at night to create a larger stream for irrigation during the day. 
(Findings f 17, R.2739; Ex. 27A.) Contrary to HCIC's argument, Water Right No. 93-
904 was not appropriating a new water right. Rather, the application was filed to change 
existing diversion facilities by constructing a new dam, enlarging the ditch and 
constructing a reservoir-again upstream from and without any protest by HCIC's 
predecessors in interest. (Exs. 5G, 27B, 27C.) 
However, even if, as argued by HCIC, the water right vested in 1889, rather than 
1882, the certificate relates to only an 80 acre portion of and not to the entire Ranch. 
15
 Affidavits are admissible to establish beneficial use of surface water prior to 1903. 
See Eskelsen 819 P.2d at 774. 
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The Monsen Affidavit and proof map confirm March 1, 1882, as the first date that 
water was diverted and placed to beneficial use for irrigation on the Ranch. (Findings 
% 17, R.2739.) Monsen's affidavit confirms that on April 15, 1881, construction of the 
diverting ditch from Cedar Creek to the Ranch was commenced. (Exs. 5G, 27B, 27C.) 
The affidavit states that on March 1, 1882, water from Cedar Creek was diverted and 
placed to beneficial use on the Ranch. Id. The proof map shows that the old dam and 
canal on Cedar Creek were replaced in 1910 by diversion works under Application 
A1408 (93-904). (Ex. 27D.) 
Contrary to HCIC's assertions, John Monsen verified in his Affidavit that he had 
first-hand knowledge of the Ranch and first beneficial water use. The trial court properly 
found that HCIC has no comparable evidence to refute the sworn Monsen Affidavit and 
accompanying verified proof map. (Findings ffif 16-23, R.2739-2741.) The proof also 
establishes that the original dam was diverting the entire flow of Cedar Creek, including 
flood waters, to irrigate 149.93 acres on the Ranch. 
Monsen's affidavit is independent evidence of first beneficial use regardless of the 
date the state engineer assigned to Certificate 107B for Water Right 93-904.16 Utah law 
required the state engineer to assign a priority date to the application based on the date of 
filing of the application. See 1905 Utah Laws, ch. 108, § 46 at 159. Accordingly, the 
On December 11, 1912, State Engineer Caleb Tanner issued to USF's predecessor 
in interest Certificate 107B covering the use of water under Application A1408 upstream 
from HCIC. (Ex. 27D.) The state engineer confirmed that all the flow of Cedar Creek 
was diverted, stored and beneficially used to irrigate 149.93 acres on the Ranch. (Id.) 
Certificate 107B is prima facie evidence of beneficial use of water by USF's predecessors 
in interest. See Little v. Greene & Weedlnv., 839 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1992); Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-3-17 (1955) (certificate of appropriation is "prima facie evidence of the 
owner's right to the use of water in the quantity, for the purpose and place and during the 
times specified therein, subject to prior rights."); Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View 
Duck Club, 166 P. 309, 311 (Utah 1917) (certificate of appropriation is user's "evidence 
of title, good at least against the state . . . and . . . against everyone else who cannot show 
a superior right.") 
state engineer had to assign a priority date based on the date of filing, June 4, 1907, 
instead of March 1, 1882, the date water was first beneficially used as a diligence right 
Contrary to HCIC's argument, the June 4, 1907 date does not bar USF from 
asserting its 1882 diligence right. USF had no reason to challenge the 1907 date the state 
engineer assigned to Certificate 107B. No one protested the 1907 application. For 
decades USF's diversion and water use was the uppermost on Cedar Creek. USF and its 
predecessors were able to use the water at their pleasure, unmolested and without any 
interference until 1989. (Findings % 26, R.2742.) USF was completely justified in using 
water upstream without protest and allowing HCIC, or any other downstream user, to try 
to appropriate whatever water remained after USF had placed the water to beneficial use. 
USF had no reason to protest or even care about HCIC's or any other downstream user's 
use of the return flow of water.17 For these reasons, USF had no reason to establish its 
1882 diligence right until its water use was challenged for the first time in 1989. 
By contrast, HCIC was on notice of USF's upstream water use that began in 1882 
and continued thereafter without challenge until 1989. USF did not wait until 1992 to 
assert an earlier priority date as HCIC contends. USF did not suddenly reverse a century 
of acquiescence. Rather, the 1889 land patent depositions, 1893 water certificate and 
1910 Monsen affidavit and proof all establish that since 1882 USF and its predecessors' 
upstream use directly challenged the alleged senior claim of HCIC. HCIC and its 
predecessors knew or should have known of the competing upstream water use. USF's 
upstream use was depriving HCIC and its predecessors of water that would have satisfied 
its asserted senior claim to the first 10.0 cfs of Cedar Creek. Instead of challenging the 
upstream use and asserting its alleged senior claim, HCIC sat idle for decades allowing 
Regional State Engineer Mark Page testified that flood irrigation as used on the 
Ranch is "around 50 percent efficient." (R.2789, T.993:18-20.) The other 50 percent not 
consumed by plants "returns to the system" for downstream use. (R.2789, T.993:24-25.) 
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USF to rely upon the water and make substantial investments in water development and 
use. 
F. HCIC'S DILIGENCE CLAIM DOES NOT BAR USF 
HCIC's 1970 diligence claim does not bar USF by estoppel, laches or waiver. 
(Findings f 26, R.2742.) HCIC incorrectly asserts that the filing of its diligence claim 
and statement of water user's claim notified USF of HCIC's alleged downstream senior 
water right. HCIC's expert witness and Regional State Engineer, Mark Page, explained 
that a "diligence claim is simply filed with the [state engineer's] office as part of our 
record, it is prima facie evidence but has not been scrutinized by the public or other water 
users." (R.2789, T. 1002:8-12.) Further, Mr. Page testified that filed diligence claims and 
statements of water user's claims, such as HCIC's, have "never been open to the public 
and been through that public process." (R.2789, T. 1002:14-15.) In other words, the 
public does not even know when or if a diligence claim has been filed with the state 
engineer. This is exactly the case here. USF did not have any notice of HCIC's alleged 
downstream diversion and was not placed on notice by HCIC's furtive filing of a 
diligence claim and water user's claim that were not open to public scrutiny. (Findings 
1f26,R.2743.) 
USF's extensive, conflicting upstream water use contradicts HCIC's assertions 
that USF did not challenge HCIC's alleged seniority between 1970 and 1992. USF did 
not wait two full decades before objecting to HCIC's claim to a senior right; USF and its 
predecessors had been objecting since 1882 by their extensive upstream water use. 
Moreover, the upstream water use was a direct sign of protest and resistance to HCIC's 
alleged senior claim. Until 1989, USF took its water first, without interference, and had 
no reason to worry about anyone diverting downstream, including HCIC. The 
interference with USF's upstream water use lasted only a short period and caused USF to 
commence this action. (Findings % 26, R.2743.) 
G. USF IS NOT BARRED BY THE 1984 PROPOSED 
DETERMINATION 
USF is not barred by the San Rafael Proposed Determination. The trial court 
correctly ruled that USF filed an objection to the San Rafael Proposed Determination and 
that USF's claims are not barred. (Findings % 27, R.2742; Conclusions % 19, R.2751.) A 
notice deadline requires only substantial compliance if the statute imposes no penalty for 
failure to comply. See Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480,481-83 (Utah 1980) 
(notice filed over two months late substantially complied with statute); In re General 
Determination of Payette River Drainage, 687 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Idaho 1984) (court has 
discretion to hear objections to proposed determination filed after 60 day deadline); 
accord Felida Neighborhood Ass 'n v. Clark County, 913 P.2d 823, 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1996) ("Failure to satisfy the notice requirements of a statute is excused where substantial 
compliance resulted in full and adequate notice."), cert denied, 922 P.2d 98 (Wash. 
1996). 
USF substantially complied with Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 by filing its objection 
to the San Rafael Proposed Determination one day after the 90 day deadline.18 The 
language of section 73-4-11 imposes no penalty for failure to timely file an objection. 
Moreover, section 73-4-11 provides that any claimant "dissatisfied" with the proposed 
determination "may" file a written objection. This is not mandatory language. Further, 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 allows a court to extend the time for filing any pleading or 
protest for "due cause shown." As it turned out, USF did not need to request an 
extension because the court accepted its 1984 objection and 1989 objection, and no one, 
18
 USF appears to have filed one day late because it did not count an extra day in 
February for leap year. The Court should reject HCIC's argument that USF filed its 
objection with the court on the 95th day. HCIC neglected to read the Certificate of 
Mailing verifying that the objection was mailed to the court on March 2, 1984. (Ex. 48B 
at 3.) The filing was effective upon mailing pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 5(b)(2) (1977) 
then in effect. 
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including HCIC, moved to strike these pleadings. For these reasons, under Stahl, USF 
needed only to comply substantially with section 73-4-11, which it did. 
This Court's decision in Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1992) does not 
apply here. In Jensen there was no independent action for monetary damages and 
declaratory and injunctive relief as there is here.19 Moreover, in Jensen, an objection was 
filed more than tliree years too late. USF's objection was filed one day late and has never 
been challenged by a motion to strike or otherwise. 
1. USF Sufficiently Objected to HCIC's "Junior" Water Right 
The trial court found that USF generally objected to the state engineer's listing of 
all rights of "junior appropriators" adverse to the "senior rights" of USF. (Findings f 27, 
R.2742; Ex. 48B, f 5.) The trial court further found that HCIC was a junior appropriator 
based on the evidence of beneficial use. (Findings ff 15-23, R.2738-41.) This Court 
should give the trial court's findings deference because HCIC has not marshaled evidence 
to challenge the findings. See In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) 
(declaring "appellants should recognize that the burden of overturning factual findings is 
a heavy one, reflective of the fact that we do not sit to retry cases submitted on disputed 
facts"). Accordingly, USF's objection was written broadly enough to include Water 
Right No. 93-1134 of HCIC for which the state engineer had recommended a senior 1885 
priority date. 
Under all the facts and circumstances involved in this case, USF had every reason 
to believe that it had the senior rights to Cedar Creek. (Findings f 26, R.2742.) USF was 
first in line to take its water upstream above any other water user. Cedar Creek was 
diverted upstream above HCIC since 1882. As such, USF was justified in generally 
19
 Filing an objection to the San Rafael Proposed Determination was unnecessary for 
USF to maintain this action against HCIC for monetary damages and declaratory and 
injunctive relief. See Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co. v. District Court, 110 P.2d 344, 
346 (Utah 1941); Smith v. District Court, 256 P. 539, 542-543 (Utah 1927). 
objecting to the listing of any other "junior" right as more senior than USF's rights. Id. 
More important here, HCIC already was on notice of USF's upstream water use which 
since 1882 had taken water that would have satisfied HCIC's alleged senior right to the 
first 10.0 cfs from Cedar Creek. HCIC did not need further notice of USF's claim to 
prior rights. HCIC was not relying on any upstream silence—there was extensive 
upstream water use, not silence. 
After HCIC finally ended generations of silence by demanding in 1989 (Exs. 127 
and 128) that USF release to HCIC the first 10.0 cfs in Cedar Creek, USF specifically 
objected to the listing of Water Right No. 93-1134 on Page 215 of the San Rafael 
Proposed Determination. (Findings fflf 26, 27, R.2742; Ex. 48C.) HCIC never moved to 
strike either USF's 1984 or 1989 objections. (Exs. 48B, 48C.) Both objections are still 
pending. These objections simply document what was happening within Cedar Creek 
since 1882—HCIC was losing water to an upstream user and did nothing to protect its 
asserted senior right downstream. 
2. HCIC Waived Its Claim that USF is Barred by the Proposed 
Determination 
In a hearing conducted by telephone three days before trial, HCIC ambushed USF. 
HCIC asserted that USF was barred by not objecting timely or otherwise to the listing of 
Water Right No. 93-1134 in the San Rafael Proposed Determination. (Findings \ 7, 
R.2730.) HCIC explained in its opening brief that "mere silence is not a waiver unless 
there is some duty or obligation to speak." Brinton v. IHCHosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 
965 (Utah 1998). (Findings f 9, R.2730.) As already established above, HCIC did have 
a duty to speak against USF's upstream water use for decades, not three days prior to or 
the first day of trial. By contrast, HCIC suffered absolutely no undue hardship or 
prejudice from USF's objection being one day late. HCIC already was on actual notice 
of USF's upstream water use and diversions of Cedar Creek that deprived HCIC of water 
to satisfy its alleged senior downstream water right. For this same reason, HCIC was not 
prejudiced by USF's failure, if any, to specifically protest the listing of Water Right No. 
93-1134 in the San Rafael Proposed Determination. 
In delaying until three days before trial-115 years after the first upstream 
diversion and use of water, thirteen years after USF's original objection (Ex. 48B) and six 
years after USF's specific objection (Ex. 48Q--HCIC is barred from asserting that USF 
failed to timely or otherwise object to Water Right No. 93-1134 listed in the San Rafael 
Proposed Determination. (Conclusions ^ 9, R.2749.) 
3. No Public Policies were Violated in Resolving this Water Dispute 
The Court should reject HCIC's public policy argument. Neither the general 
water rights adjudication statutes in Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-11 to -15 (1989) nor the 
"mini" adjudication statute in Section 73-4-24 precluded the trial court from exercising 
jurisdiction over USF's claims against HCIC for declaratory and injunctive relief and 
monetary damages. (Findings flf 5, 6, R.2736; Conclusions fflj 2, 3, R.2747.) This Court 
has recognized that the general adjudication process in Sections 73-4-11 to -15 is not the 
exclusive procedure for water users to assert their claims. Murdoch v. Springville 
Municipal Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994) (district courts have discretion to hear 
petitions for "mini" adjudication of water rights under Section 73-4-24 outside general 
adjudications); see also, Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co. v. District Court, 110 P.2d 344, 
346 (Utah 1941) (independent claims for monetary damages and other relief not available 
in general adjudications may proceed in district court outside such adjudications); Smith 
v. District Court, 256 P. 539, 542-43 (Utah 1927) (same). Further, these cases confirm 
that filing an objection to a proposed determination is not required to maintain an 
independent action for monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief outside 
either a general adjudication or "mini" adjudication. 
Ruling for USF here will not invite every litigant in a general adjudication who 
misses the statutory deadline to file a separate action. Such litigants would have to 
demonstrate: (i) they acted for over a century as the senior right holder upstream from all 
other downstream users; (ii) they filed an objection one day late and then supplemented 
the objection, but no one ever moved to strike these objections; and (iii) their opponent 
waited to raise the issue until the eve of trial after being on notice for 115 years of the 
conflicting, extensive upstream water use. 
Finally, nothing prevented the state engineer from intervening in the present 
action. The state engineer was not deprived of the opportunity to be heard in this case as 
HCIC asserts. The state engineer allowed Regional State Engineer Mark Page to testify 
in the case. The public interest of opening the courthouse doors for monetary and 
injunctive relief outside of general water adjudications outweighs the interests precluding 
such relief. 
H. HCIC--NOT USF--IS BARRED BY LACHES 
The doctrine of laches under Great Western Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Farmers 
Reservoir & Irr. Co., 124 P.2d 753, 754 (Colo. 1942), cited by HCIC, applies against 
HCIC, not USF. (Findings 1f 24, R.2741.) USF is not guilty of laches in this case. USF, 
not HCIC, has been in peaceful possession of Cedar Creek water upstream from HCIC. 
USF did not injure HCIC by any delay in asserting its priority to Cedar Creek water. 
Since 1882 USF and its predecessors manifested their senior right to divert the water in 
Cedar Creek upstream before any other water user, including HCIC. All downstream 
users, including HCIC, were on notice that the water was being diverted upstream and 
used on the Ranch, the town of Mohrland and later in the town of Hiawatha. There was 
no secret about it. USF's upstream water use was documented and advertised in 
accordance with applicable water law since 1876 in the Emery County Recorder's office, 
Castle Valley News, and Emery County Progress, placing all users on notice. 
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II. USF HAS NOT FORFEITED ANY OF ITS WATER RIGHTS 
HCIC did not sustain its burden of proving that USF forfeited water rights in 
Cedar Creek prior to December 1, 1982 when the state engineer published the San Rafael 
Proposed Determination. (Findings ffif 28-39, R.2743-46.) SeeDaltonv. Wadley, 355 
P.2d 69, 72 (Utah 1960) (water rights that could not be used without violating state 
engineer's proposed determination cannot be forfeited); Glenwoodlrr. Co. v. Myers, 465 
P.2d 1013, 1014 (Utah 1970) (same). 
A. USF BENEFICIALLY USED ALL AVAILABLE WATER FROM 
CEDAR CREEK 
In discussing the law of forfeiture, HCIC neglected to inform the Court of the 
most important principle for this case. This Court unequivocally established that there 
can be no forfeiture where a water source fails to yield sufficient water to satisfy a water 
right, and all available water is placed to beneficial use. See Rocky Fordlrr. Co. v. Kents 
Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 111-113 (Utah 1943). In Rocky Ford, there was 
uncontroverted evidence that 'there seldom was sufficient water available" from the 
water source for an irrigation company to use beneficially all of the water that it had a 
right to use under its water rights. 135 P.2d at 111-112. For this reason, this Court 
rejected the plaintiffs' forfeiture claim because they could not prove a continuous five 
year period during which the defendants "failed to use available water." Id. at 112. 
Reasonable cause for nonuse also includes droughts, floods, financial crisis, industrial 
depression, operation of legal proceedings or any other unavoidable cause. See Utah 
Code Ann. §73-1-4 (1989).20 
To avoid forfeiture, available water must be used in only one year in every five-
year period. See Rocky Ford, 135 P.2d at 112-13. In addition to the foregoing, the filing 
of a nonuse application, prior to the expiration of the five year period, tolls the running of 
the nonuse statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1989). 
As in Rocky Ford, USF has not forfeited water rights because HCIC failed to 
prove that for a period of five continuous years, USF did not place all available water to 
beneficial use. The evidence shows that there was not available water to irrigate all the 
acreage on the Ranch. (Findings f 25, R.2741). HCIC did not marshal critical evidence 
that explains why irrigation was limited. Instead HCIC focused exclusively on testimony 
concerning the number of acres irrigated on the Ranch over the years. The weight of the 
evidence and testimony from witnesses of both sides is uncontroverted that the quantity 
of water available in Cedar Creek has not been sufficient to annually irrigate more acres 
of land on the Ranch.21 USF and its predecessors used all of the available water from 
Cedar Creek for irrigating the Ranch and had ditches and furrows in place ready to 
irrigate other lands on the Ranch had sufficient water been available.22 This lack of 
Lamond Gardner, HCIC's witness, testified, "There wasn't sufficient water to 
irrigate 229 acres" on the Ranch. (R.2790, T. 1297:18-20.) USF's witness, JohnNielson, 
testified that he irrigated "around 50, 60 acres, depending on the supply of water. We 
used what water we had." (R.2785, T.86:20-23.) When asked why he did not irrigate 
more acres, he stated, 'We used all the water there was." (R.2785, T. 125:12.) USF's 
witness, Jimmy Allred, testified that he did not irrigate more acres on the Ranch because 
he "didn't have enough - any more water" and that he "would have irrigated more land" 
if he had more water. (R.2786, T.479:11-13.) USF's witness, Larry Pierce, testified that 
he would have tried to irrigate more land "if we had the water We would irrigate 
everything that we could when the water was there," and there were fields and ditches in 
place to divert water if he had enough water. (R.2787, T.581:24-582:1.) Mr. Pierce 
estimated that the average flow of Cedar Creek in the spring was "a foot to two and a half 
foot," and in the summer was "maybe a half a foot to none." (R.2787, T.585:13-20.) Mr. 
Pierce also testified that he could not grow crops on the Ranch because "I run [sic] out of 
water in the summertime." (R.2787, T.594:14-15.) USF's witness, Robert Gitlin, 
testified that "we had a lot of fields to irrigate if the water was available, but there was 
never water available." (R.2787, T.621:18-22.) He also testified that the lessees were 
always asking for '"what water was available." (R.2788, T.814:16-19.) He also testified 
that the average annual flow that went through the pipe to Hiawatha from the Mohrland 
Portal was 1.8 cfs. (R.2788, T.813:19.) 
22
 USF's witness, John Nielson, testified that before the pipeline went in he received 
enough waste water in some years from the Ranch to irrigate his 40 acre parcel on his 
farm below the Ranch. He testified that after the pipeline went in "[t]here wasn't any. 
They took all the water normally that I used for my little ranch. When they put the 
1A 
available water prevented forfeiture. Further, the drought years in the 1950's, 1977 and 
1987 cannot be counted toward a forfeiture. These events were physical causes beyond 
the control of USF from which no forfeiture can result. See Rocky Ford, 135 P.2d at 111-
113; Utah Code Ann. 73-1-4 (1989). 
In addition, the flow of Cedar Creek averages less than 2.0 cfs during the early 
irrigation season and dwindled to less than 1.0 cfs in late summer. (Findings f 25, R. 
2741; R.2785, T. 145:1-4; R.2789; R.2790, T. 1239:12-22.) The meager flow proves that 
there was not sufficient water available to irrigate more acreage on the Ranch. The 
historical flow is only a small fraction of the 5.246 cfs that USF has a right to use for 
irrigating the Ranch. The limited water flow in Cedar Creek explains why only a 
fraction of the 229 acres could have been irrigated on the Ranch. (R.2792, T. 1839:10-
1840:8.) There simply has not been enough water to irrigate more acres. This fact 
prevents any forfeiture of USF's right to irrigate up to 135.66 acres on the Ranch as 
properly found by the trial court. (Conclusions f 13, R.2750; Order % 3, R.2758.) 
B. USF COULD NOT PARTIALLY FORFEIT WATER RIGHTS 
UNDER EXISTING LAW 
This Court should not impose the harsh penalty of partial forfeiture without clear 
precedent or statutory authority. The Court should reject HCIC's assertions that USF has 
partially forfeited its water rights for irrigating more than 30 to 50 acres on the Ranch and 
watering livestock in the winter. These assertions are contrary to the trial court findings. 
(Findings fflf 30, 39, R.2743, 2746.) This Court has never decided whether a partial 
forfeiture of a water right can occur, even though some justices have addressed the 
possibility. (Findings f 28, R.2743); Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 775 n.9 
(Utah 1991); Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 135 P.2d 108, 112 (Utah 
pipeline in, there was not enough waste water come [sic] off to do any good." (R.2785, 
T.141:14-17.) But before the pipeline went in there was enough waste water for Mr. 
Nielson to use in only "some years." (R.2785, T. 128:1.) 
1943). In Eskelsen, the trial court concluded that partial forfeiture does not apply in 
Utah. 819P.2dat775n.9. The Court properly left the matter to the Legislature.23 
C HCIC DID NOT MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE OF IRRIGATED 
ACRES 
HCIC, as the appellant, has failed to carry its heavy burden of marshaling all the 
evidence that supports the trial court's findings of fact regarding irrigation of the Ranch. 
(Findings ffij 17, 18, 21, 23, 30, R.2739, 2741,2743; Conclusions ffl[ 5-7, 13, R.2748; 
Order fflf 3, 4, R.2758.) HCIC "must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). As the Utah Court 
of Appeals explained in discussing this Court's decisions on marshalling, 
[t]o successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. Attorneys 
must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly 
discharge the marshaling duty the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists. 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). 
In attempting to marshal the evidence of beneficial use on the Ranch, HCIC fell 
significantly short of marshaling "every scrap" of evidence which it resists. HCIC did 
not provide the Court with the extensive evidence contained in the state engineer's files 
23
 House Bill 58 recently enacted this year by the Utah Legislature recognizes partial 
forfeiture of water rights but does not apply retroactively to the present case that was 
commenced in 1992. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (stating a statute is only retroactive if 
"expressly so declared"). See also Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. 
Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1995) (same). 
submitted over many years, without protest by HCIC, to support USF's upstream water 
use. (Findings ^ 30, R.2743-44.) The following chart summarizes the evidence that 
HCIC overlooked and on which the trial court relied in making its findings of fact: 
Date 
June 4,1907 
July 10, 1910 
August 1, 1912 
November 12, 1912 
February 26, 1936 
October 11, 1957 
July, 1960 
October, 1960 
April 6,1962 
May 28, 1962 
June 4, 1962 
Number of Acres 
Irrigated on Ranch 
149.93 
149.93 
149.93 
149.93 
150 acres (incidental use) 
135.66 
135.66 
135.66 
135.66 
135.66 
135.66 
Exhibit 
27B 
27D 
27C 
27E 
29 
27G 
32C 
27H 
271 
32B 
32D 
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DON BARNETFS 
TESTIMONY 
The trial court properly exercised its considerable discretion in allowing Mr. 
Barnett's testimony. This Court has made clear that a trial court's decision to allow 
rebuttal testimony and expert testimony will not be overturned, unless there is a "clear 
showing of abuse." See Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974); Adams v. 
Lang, 275 P.2d 881, 883 (Utah 1954); Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, If 19. Proper 
rebuttal evidence is "evidence tending to refute, modify, explain or otherwise minimize 
or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence." Green \ 23. 
At trial, the court correctly allowed Mr. Barnett to provide rebuttal testimony 
refuting the opinion testimony of HCIC's witnesses on the number of acres irrigated on 
the Ranch. (R.2792, T. 1808:13-17.) Mr. Barnett's testimony was proper and expressly 
rebutted HCIC's evidence of irrigated acres. In particular, Mr. Barnett refuted the several 
HCIC witness opinions on the number of acres irrigated at the Ranch based upon, in 
many cases, windshield observations made by these witnesses over the years. (R.2790, 
T. 1249:8-12; 1254:1-10; 1256:15; 1257:5; 1323:7; 13224:34; 1339:4-9; 1356:1-4; 
R.2791, T.1682:15-1683:20; T.1703:8-1704:9; T.1710:18-1711:4.) The trial court's 
admission of Mr. Bamett's rebuttal evidence cannot be classified as an abuse of 
discretion on the grounds that the testimony convincingly refuted HCIC's evidence. 
Moreover, the cases cited by HCIC do not support its claim that the trial court 
abused its discretion. For instance, in Arnold v. Curtis, this Court upheld a trial court's 
exercise of discretion to exclude evidence offered in violation of a scheduling order. 846 
P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1993). Arnold is clearly distinguishable here because Arnold does 
not stand for the proposition that courts must exclude testimony if offered after a 
deadline in a court's scheduling order but that courts have discretion to "make such 
orders." Id. (citing Utah R.Civ.P. 16(d)). In this case, the trial court exercised its 
discretion and chose not to exclude Mr. Bamett's testimony. The court's decision was 
proper, especially given that HCIC has failed to argue or present evidence demonstrating 
that the designation of Mr. Bamett as a witness prejudiced HCIC in any way. 
Similarly, Turner and Roundy do not apply here because both cases involved 
situations where parties sought to introduce previously unidentified witnesses at trial. 
See Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Utah 1994) (upholding trial court's refusal to 
allow rebuttal witness not identified prior to trial); Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App 229, 
fflf 13 - 15 (reversing trial court's allowance of rebuttal witness improperly not identified 
i « 
prior to trial). In this case, USF identified Mr. Barnett prior to trial and over a month 
before the deadline for depositions. (R.984-88, 1031-32). 
HCIC's allegation that the trial court abused its discretion rings hollow 
considering HCIC has not alleged that it was prejudiced or surprised24 by Mr. Barnett's 
testimony. Simply, HCIC has failed to demonstrate any abuse by the trial court 
especially where the trial court's decision comports with the general rule that 'testimony 
presented for the purpose of rebuttal should be admitted, even if the rebuttal is somewhat 
repetitive of testimony on issues addressed during the case-in-chief." Green f 23. As 
this Court has explained, a trial court's decision to allow rebuttal evidence will not be 
overturned absent abuse. Moreover, HCIC's concentration on what was presented in the 
case-in-chief is misplaced given the fact that rebuttal may cover issues already presented 
in the case-in-chief. See id. 
Distilled to its essence, HCIC's complaint with Mr. Barnett's testimony is that 
HCIC does not agree with the conclusion the testimony compels. Instead of seeking to 
exclude the testimony after the trial court has admitted the evidence, HCIC should have 
presented its own rebuttal evidence. HCIC's disagreement with Mr. Barnett's testimony 
is an insufficient basis for alleging that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial 
court's admission of Mr. Barnett's testimony should be affirmed. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF 135.66 IRRIGATED ACRES 
ON THE RANCH WAS PROPER 
The trial court weighed the evidence of beneficial use and found that the weight of 
the evidence supported a finding of 135.66 acres irrigated on the Ranch. (Findings ffif 17, 
18, 21, 23, 30, R.2739, 2741,2743; Conclusions ffif 5, 6, 7, 13, R.2748, 50; Order fflf 3,4, 
24
 HCIC cannot claim surprise because USF identified Mr. Barnett as an expert 
witness on December 13, 1996 and filed his report three days later. (R.984-88.) 
Moreover, HCIC had until January 21, 1997 to depose Mr. Barnett but chose not to avail 
itself of this discovery tool. (R. 1031.) 
R.2758.) The trial court never mentioned that it relied upon Mr. Barnett's testimony in 
reaching this conclusion. Id. Rather, the Court relied, in part, upon Certificate No. a406 
for change Application No. a3317 issued by the state engineer. (Findings \ 30, R.2743-
44.) The trial court obviously questioned the credibility of the lay witness testimony and 
instead relied upon engineering and surveyed proofs confirming the extent of irrigation 
on the Ranch. This Court should not second-guess the trial court's assessment of all of 
the evidence of beneficial use, especially because HCIC has not properly marshaled the 
evidence. 
Of the time periods of use listed by HCIC, only the 1940s, 1950s, 1962-68, and 
the 1970s are relevant here. The Utah Supreme Court held in In re Escalante Valley 
Drainage Area, 363 P.2d 777 (Utah 1961), that water users "should be neither expected 
nor required to use their water contrary to the state engineer's proposed determination in 
order to protect their rights." Id. at 778. More directly, <cthe filing of the state engineer's 
proposed determination . . . interrupted the running of the nonuse statute against the 
plaintiffs." Id. The court correctly held that the plaintiffs did not forfeit their water 
rights. Id. 
In this case, the filing of the San Rafael Proposed Determination in December 
1982 interrupted the running of the nonuse statute against USF and it was not required to 
use water contrary to this determination to avoid forfeiture. Moreover, USF is not trying 
to "have its cake and eat it too." USF filed its objections to the San Rafael Proposed 
Determination and placed at issue its water rights against those of HCIC. (Findings % 27, 
R.2743.) 
In addition, the lack of available water, not USF's alleged waste, has determined 
the number of acres irrigated on the Ranch. HCIC did not sustain its burden as to the 
25
 The Court should ignore HCIC's attempt to limit USF's water right by its 
manipulation of the average .9 cfs flow rate into an annual acre foot limit. As Don 
An 
relevant time frames by showing that Cedar Creek yielded a sufficient supply of water for 
USF to irrigate more land than it did. Further, the weight of the evidence confirms that 
between 105 and 140 acres are and were irrigated on the Ranch. (Findings % 30, R.2743; 
Conclusions % 13, R.2750; Exs. 27B, 27C, 27D, 27E, 27G, 27H, 271, 29, 32B, 32C, 32D, 
R.2792,T. 1810:22-24.) 
F. USF DID NOT PARTIALLY FORFEIT ITS STOCKWATERING 
WATER RIGHT NO. 93-267 
The trial court specifically found no forfeiture of USF's stockwatering rights. 
(Findings % 39, R.2746.) The Court should reject HCIC's assertion that USF forfeited its 
right to water livestock in the wintertime under Water Right No. 93-267. HCIC's expert 
witness and former state engineer, Dee Hansen, testified that stockwatering has no 
seasonable limit and is a year-round use. (R.2791, T. 1637:20-1638:7.) Moreover, 
stockwatering is considered an incidental use to irrigation—if the cattle are near water 
and they are thirsty, they will drink the water. (R.2791, T. 1728:21-1729:6.) HCIC's 
argument admits that USF stockwatered during the Spring, Summer and Fall during the 
period they identify. (HCIC Brief at 44-45.) This use is sufficient to preserve USF's 
stockwatering rights against reduction under Rocky Ford. HCIC failed to prove that the 
quantity of water used by the livestock on the Ranch during the Spring, Summer, and Fall 
each year did not consume all of the water that USF had a right to beneficially use each 
year for stockwatering. The trial court correctly concluded that HCIC failed to prove 5 
consecutive years of nonuse throughout each season of each year. (Findings f 39, 
R.2746.) 
Barnett explained, to calculate an annual volume in acre feet from an average daily 
diversion rate, or vis-a-versa, is misleading because the Court must falsely assume that 
Cedar Creek flows at that constant rate year round. (R.2792, T.1821:14-1823:19). The 
evidence confirmed that Cedar Creek flows were not constant but fluctuated widely from 
10.0 cfs in the early spring to less than .10 cfs in late summer. See Findings *U 25. 
G. USF DID NOT FORFEIT ITS RIGHTS BY EXCESSIVE WASTE OF 
WATER 
The trial court correctly rejected HCIC's assertion that USF's failure to line its 
ditch with concrete or otherwise prevent seepage constitutes waste. (Conclusions f 11, 
R.2749.) HCIC presented no evidence from which the trial court could find that USF 
violated any customary and accepted irrigation practices in the area for similar soil types. 
Id. 
HCIC cites to no authority that seepage from a diversion ditch results in forfeiture 
of a water right. Wayman v. Murray City Corporation, 458 P.2d 861 (Utah 1969), is 
inapposite because that case does not address forfeiture or waste, but allocation of 
underground water among competing wells xmder a "rule of reasonableness" that does not 
apply to surface streams. Id. at 865. Further, Brian v. Fremont Irrigation Co., 186 P.2d 
588 (Utah 1947), does not apply here because it too has nothing to do with forfeiture or 
waste; it involved injury to crops caused by overflow of surplus water from upstream 
diversions. 
Moreover, the treatise cited by HCIC recognizes that '"there is bound to be some 
loss of the water in transit between the point of diversion and the place of use." Clesson 
S. Kinney, Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights § 907, at 1601 (2d ed. 1912). Further, 
water evaporates and seeps through ditches, but this does not "constitute . . . the wasting 
of water." Id. 
HCIC has not established that USF's use of water on the Ranch was unreasonable 
in light of the customary irrigation practices in the area and on similar soil types. 
(Conclusions f 11, R.2749.) There is absolutely no evidence that water users in areas 
with similar soil conditions customarily line ditches to prevent seepage or that this could 
be done by reasonable effort and expense. As Robert Eccli confirmed, USF considered 
lining the ditch but made the business decision not to do so. (R.2790, T. 1395:25-
1397:21.) Moreover, the use of unlined ditches is customary in this area, as evidenced by 
John Nielson's diversion ditches located below the Ranch. (R.2785, T.89:10-24.) In 
fact, flood irrigation systems and unlined diversion ditches, as used on the Ranch, are 
customary and accepted by the state engineer-despite being 50 percent efficient. 
(R.2789, T.993:16-20, M. Page; Ex. 48A, San Rafael Proposed Determination, f 8, at iii-
iv.) 
USF's diversion and irrigation system is much more efficient than the accepted 
method in Emery County. Larry Pierce testified that in the Spring and Fall seepage from 
USF's diversion ditch was only about 10 percent, and in the summer there was "no 
water" in Cedar Creek ccto divert anyway," so the amount of seepage in the diversion 
ditch did not matter. (R.2787, T.595:3-20).26 Moreover, Jimmy Allred testified that the 
seepage was only about "one-third or less" but it varied "from July and August." 
(R.2786, T.470:5-20.) Mr. Pierce tried to grow crops on the Ranch, but he could not 
because he ran "out of water in the summertime." (R.2787, T.594:14-15.) Lack of water 
in Cedar Creek in the summer led to watering primarily pasture grasses on the Ranch 
(R.2787, T.581:11-18), which is a recognized beneficial use. See In re Escalante Valley 
Drainage Area, 355 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1960); (R.2790, T.1285:7-ll, L. Gardner). 
HCIC's claims of extraordinary waste of water by USF are unfounded. HCIC has 
not marshaled the evidence to question the trial court's findings that USF did not waste 
water. (Findings ff 17, 18, 21, 24, 25, 30, R.2739, 2740, 2741, 2743; Conclusions f 11, 
R.2749); Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (holding that "[i]f the 
appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record 
26
 Robert Eccli never testified that there was 45 percent seepage; rather, he testified 
that he never measured the seepage in USF's ditch. (R.2790, T. 1396:18-22.) Moreover, 
the figure referenced in Exhibit 36 was derived from measurements taken over just a 16 
day period in 1961 and is not representative of seepage in the ditch each year from 1882 
to 1992. 
supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the 
lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case"). HCIC 
exaggerates the testimony of Robert Gitlin. Mr. Gitlin did nol testify that water was used 
on the same place day after day on the Ranch. Gitlin testified that he did not intentionally 
make a practice of letting the water run on the land and then turning it back to Cedar 
Creek. (R.2787, T.621:18-22, 626:5-11). After Gitlin testified to this effect, counsel for 
HCIC pressed: "So if witnesses come and say that they saw for weeks on end the water 
running through the same location on the ranch and then going back to the creek, they'd 
be mistaken?" Gitlin responded: "Not necessarily. We could have missed it." (R.2787, 
T.628:5-10). Gitlin's honest admission that within a ten-year span of operations on the 
Ranch, there may have been a missed rotation, does not evidence excessive waste of 
water. To the contrary, Gitlin testified that there was no waste of water on the Ranch. 
See id 
HCIC also overstates that the testimony of Kay Jensen and Lamond Gardner 
established that USF wasted water. The repetitious testimony of HCIC s witnesses 
appeared to be coached to "toe the party line" as to irrigation practices on the Ranch. 
Their "canned" testimony lacked credibility, something that the trial court obviously 
recognized and another reason for not second-guessing on appeal. Jensen testified that he 
was "pretty familiar" with the Ranch; however, he never worked on the Ranch, and his 
observations of the Ranch are at best isolated incidents, not daily observations necessary 
to prove excessive waste. (R.2789, T. 1104:15-21, 1116:3-1118:7). HCIC also 
exaggerates Mr. Gardner's testimony. Gardner rarely, if ever, went on the Ranch in the 
1950's and 1960's. (R.2790, T. 1282:1-1283:14). Gardner did not make daily 
observations to allow him to credibly testify that water continuously ran to waste on the 
Ranch. Like Jensen, Gardner's observations at best were isolated, sporadic incidents, and 
do not establish systematic waste of water on the Ranch. 
44 
USF's use of a diversion ditch and any seepage associated therewith was not 
shown by HCIC to be unreasonable in light of the customary and accepted irrigation 
practices in the area and on similar soil types. (Conclusions f 11.) USF's use of its 
diversion ditch did not constitute excessive waste of water and did not result in any 
forfeiture of water rights. Id. Water that seeped from USF's ditch would have been 
available for HCIC and other downstream water users. There is insufficient evidence to 
conclude that seepage from USF's unlined ditch is not customary in the area and is not a 
reasonably efficient method of irrigation or that water from Cedar Creek was allowed to 
run to waste on the Ranch. In fact, using unlined ditches is customary and accepted in 
the San Rafael Drainage Area. (R.2789, T.993:16-20; Ex. 48A, San Rafael Proposed 
Determination, f 8, at iii-iv.) Finally, HCIC's assertions of water running onto the Ranch 
in the wintertime could not result in any forfeiture of irrigation rights because there exists 
no right to divert in the wintertime for irrigation purposes. 
H. WATER RIGHT NO, 93-3524 HAS NOT BEEN FORFEITED 
USF has not forfeited the borehole Water Right No. 93-3524 allowing it to divert 
.37 cfs from Cedar Creek for use in Hiawatha. This Court has ruled that HCIC has not 
sustained its burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence that available water under 
this right was not beneficially used for a continuous five-year period. (Findings 1ft[ 35, 
36, R.2745; Conclusions ffif 15, 16, R.2750.) 
1. The State Engineer's Nonuse Extensions Prevented Forfeiture of 
Water Right No, 93-3524 
The state engineer granted extensions to resume use covering nearly a 50 year 
period, including the period from 1964 to 1972 disputed by HCIC. (Exs. 50B-J.) By 
statute, the nonuse extensions granted by the state engineer prevented Water Right No. 
3524 from being forfeited. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4 (1989). Extension No. 151 
filed in 1963 granted USF until 1968 to resume water use. (Ex. 50F.) Extension No. 218 
filed in 1968 granted USF until 1973 to resume water use. (Ex. 50E.) In 1972, USF 
resumed use of the .37 cfs in Hiawatha after its pipeline was completed. Both of the 
extensions covered Change Certificate a268 for .37 cfs under Water Right No. 93-3524. 
(Ex. 3 ID). HCIC had many opportunities to protest, participate and appeal each of the 
extensions but instead sat idle until asserting forfeiture too late in this action. 
(Conclusions f 16, R.2750.) These extensions shield USF from HCIC's dilatory 
forfeiture claims. 
2. HCIC is Barred from Asserting Water Right JNo, 93-3524 is 
Forfeited 
In addition, HCIC is barred from asserting that Water Right No. 93-3524 is 
forfeited. (Conclusions % 16, R.2750.) As explained above, HCIC had a duty to appeal 
the state engineer's decision approving the extension applications and pipeline change 
applications and raise all issues, including any alleged forfeiture of water rights in an 
appeal to district court. See Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Myers, 465 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Utah 
1970) (barring protestant's forfeiture action filed three years after protestant should have 
filed appeal of state engineer's approval of nonuse application); Provo City v. Lambert, 
545 P.2d 185, 186-187 (Utah 1976) (barring protestant from filing lawsuit challenging 
water rights 23 years after protestant should have filed appeal of state engineer's 
decision); East Bench Irr. Co. v. Utah, 300 P.2d 603, 606-607 (Utah 1956) ("there are 
issues in every appeal from the [state engineer's] decision[s] which must be adjudicated" 
such as "impairment of vested rights" and "priority of conflicting rights."). 
The Court should reject HCIC's assertion that it is not barred by failing to appeal 
the state engineer's decision approving the nonuse extensions and pipeline change 
applications. HCIC did not protest USF's nonuse applications filed in 1963 and 1968. 
HCIC protested (Ex. 33D) the 1972 pipeline change applications, including the change 
application (Ex. 35A) for Water Right No. 93-3524. However, the trial court correctly 
found that HCIC did not appeal the state engineer's decision and has estopped from 
asserting forfeiture by USF. (Conclusions ffif 15, 16, R.2750.) HCIC had a duty to 
appeal the state engineer's approval of these applications. USF relied on HCIC's silence 
and made substantial investments to complete its pipeline and place the .37 cfs to 
beneficial use in Hiawatha. Id. HCIC is now barred from asserting that Water Right No. 
93-3524 is forfeited. Id 
3. Beneficial Use, Even if Illegal, Prevented Forfeiture 
The Court should reject HCIC's arguments that illegal beneficial use leads to 
forfeiture of water rights. This Court has established that a beneficial use, albeit illegal, 
prevents forfeiture of water rights. See Eskelsen, 819 P.2d at 776. In Eskelsen, a, town 
illegally leased its water rights for irrigation. The lease violated a Utah Constitution 
provision prohibiting towns from leasing or selling their water rights. The Court affirmed 
the trial court's decision that there was no forfeiture because the water had been placed to 
beneficial use, albeit illegally. See id. 
The Eskelsen decision shreds HCIC's assertions that beneficial use on the Ranch 
did not prevent a forfeiture of Water Right No. 93-3524. The beneficial use of the .37 cfs 
on the Ranch during the period from 1964 to 1972 protected the water right. 
(Conclusions % 16, R.2750.) The 1964 and 1968 water rights summaries, upon which 
HCIC relies, state that a change application should be filed to cover the use of the .37 cfs 
on the Ranch. (Exs. 158, at 44, 159, at 2.) Because the borehole diversion was upstream 
from the Ranch diversion, water that was not diverted into the borehole continued down 
Cedar Creek and was diverted and used to irrigate the Ranch. USF's nonuse applications 
explained, "While the use under Certificate No. 2195 will be temporarily discontinued, 
this water will not be wasted but will be used during the irrigation season on the Ranch." 
(Ex. 50I-J, at 2.) The water was placed to beneficial use even if there was no change 
application. Moreover, the evidence also confirms that USF placed to use all of the water 
available in Cedar Creek. This beneficial use prevented forfeiture of Water Right No. 93-
3524. (Findings ffl| 35, 36, R.2745; Conclusions U 14, R.2750.) 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be 
AFFIRMED. 
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